Chapter 15: Security





Chapter 15: Security

- The Security Problem
- Program Threats
- System and Network Threats
- Cryptography as a Security Tool
- User Authentication
- Implementing Security Defenses
- Firewalling to Protect Systems and Networks
- Computer-Security Classifications
- An Example: Windows XP





Objectives

- To discuss security threats and attacks
- To explain the fundamentals of encryption, authentication, and hashing
- To examine the uses of cryptography in computing
- To describe the various countermeasures to security attacks





The Security Problem

- Security must consider external environment of the system, and protect the system resources.
- Intruders (crackers) attempt to breach security.
- Threat is potential security violation.
- Attack is attempt to breach security.
- Attack can be accidental or malicious.
- Easier to protect against accidental than malicious misuse.






Security Violations

- Categories
 - Breach of confidentiality
 - Breach of integrity
 - Breach of availability
 - Theft of service
 - Denial of service
- Methods
 - Masquerading (breach authentication)
 - Replay attack
 - Message modification
 - Man-in-the-middle attack
 - Session hijacking





Standard Security Attacks







Security Measure Levels

- Security must occur at four levels to be effective:
 - Physical
 - Human
 - Avoid social engineering, phishing, dumpster diving
 - Operating System
 - Network
- Security is as weak as the weakest link in the chain





Program Threats

Trojan Horse

- Code segment that misuses its environment
- Exploits mechanisms for allowing programs written by users to be executed by other users
- Spyware, pop-up browser windows, covert channels

Trap Door

- Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security procedures
- Could be included in a compiler

Logic Bomb

Program that initiates a security incident under certain circumstances

Stack and Buffer Overflow

 Exploits a bug in a program (overflow either the stack or memory buffers)




C Program with Buffer-overflow Condition

```
#include <stdio.h>
#define BUFFER SIZE 256
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  char buffer[BUFFER SIZE];
  if (argc < 2)
      return -1;
  else {
       strcpy(buffer,argv[1]);
      return 0;
```





Layout of Typical Stack Frame








Modified Shell Code

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
   execvp(''\bin\sh'', ''\bin \sh'', NULL);
   return 0;
}
```





Hypothetical Stack Frame





Program Threats (Cont.)

Viruses

- Code fragment embedded in legitimate program
- Very specific to CPU architecture, operating system, applications
- Usually borne via email or as a macro
 - Visual Basic Macro to reformat hard drive

```
Sub AutoOpen()
Dim oFS

Set oFS =
   CreateObject(''Scripting.FileSystemObject'')
   vs = Shell(''c:command.com /k format
       c:'',vbHide)
End Sub
```






Program Threats (Cont.)

- Virus dropper inserts virus onto the system
- Many categories of viruses, literally many thousands of viruses
 - File
 - Boot
 - Macro
 - Source code
 - Polymorphic
 - Encrypted
 - Stealth
 - Tunneling
 - Multipartite
 - Armored





A Boot-sector Computer Virus







System and Network Threats

- Worms use spawn mechanism; standalone program
- Internet worm
 - Exploited UNIX networking features (remote access) and bugs in finger and sendmail programs
 - Grappling hook program uploaded main worm program

Port scanning

 Automated attempt to connect to a range of ports on one or a range of IP addresses


Denial of Service

- Overload the targeted computer preventing it from doing any useful work
- Distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) come from multiple sites at once





The Morris Internet Worm








Cryptography as a Security Tool

- Broadest security tool available
 - Source and destination of messages cannot be trusted without cryptography
 - Means to constrain potential senders (sources) and / or receivers (destinations) of messages
- Based on secrets (keys)





Secure Communication over Insecure Medium







Encryption

- **Encryption** algorithm consists of:
 - Set of K keys
 - Set of M Messages
 - Set of C ciphertexts (encrypted messages)
 - A function $E: K \to (M \to C)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, E(k) is a function for generating ciphertexts from messages
 - ▶ Both E and E(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions
 - A function $D: K \to (C \to M)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, D(k) is a function for generating messages from ciphertexts
 - ▶ Both D and D(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions
- An encryption algorithm must provide this essential property: Given a ciphertext $c \in C$, a computer can compute m such that E(k)(m) = c only if it possesses D(k).
 - Thus, a computer holding D(k) can decrypt ciphertexts to the plaintexts used to produce them, but a computer not holding D(k) cannot decrypt ciphertexts
 - Since ciphertexts are generally exposed (for example, sent on the network), it is important that it be infeasible to derive D(k) from the ciphertexts



Symmetric Encryption

- Same key used to encrypt and decrypt
 - E(k) can be derived from D(k), and vice versa
- DES is most commonly used symmetric block-encryption algorithm (created by US Govt)
 - Encrypts a block of data at a time
- Triple-DES considered more secure
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), twofish up and coming
- RC4 is most common symmetric stream cipher, but known to have vulnerabilities
 - Encrypts/decrypts a stream of bytes (i.e wireless transmission)
 - Key is a input to psuedo-random-bit generator
 - Generates an infinite keystream





Asymmetric Encryption

- Public-key encryption based on each user having two keys:
 - public key published key used to encrypt data
 - private key key known only to individual user used to decrypt data
- Must be an encryption scheme that can be made public without making it easy to figure out the decryption scheme
 - Most common is RSA block cipher
 - Efficient algorithm for testing whether or not a number is prime
 - No efficient algorithm is know for finding the prime factors of a number





Asymmetric Encryption (Cont.)

- Formally, it is computationally infeasible to derive D(k_d, N) from E(k_e, N), and so E(k_e, N) need not be kept secret and can be widely disseminated
 - $E(k_e, N)$ (or just k_e) is the public key
 - $D(k_d, N)$ (or just k_d) is the **private key**
 - N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q (for example, p and q are 512 bits each)
 - Encryption algorithm is $E(k_e, N)(m) = m^{k_e} \mod N$, where k_e satisfies $k_e k_d \mod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$
 - The decryption algorithm is then $D(k_d, N)(c) = c^{k_d} \mod N$






Asymmetric Encryption Example

- For example. make p = 7 and q = 13
- We then calculate N = 7*13 = 91 and (p-1)(q-1) = 72
- We next select k_e relatively prime to 72 and < 72, yielding 5
- Finally, we calculate k_d such that $k_e k_d$ mod 72 = 1, yielding 29
- We how have our keys
 - Public key, k_{e} , N = 5, 91
 - Private key, k_d , N = 29, 91
- Encrypting the message 69 with the public key results in the cyphertext 62
- Cyphertext can be decoded with the private key
 - Public key can be distributed in cleartext to anyone who wants to communicate with holder of public key





Encryption and Decryption using RSA Asymmetric Cryptography







Cryptography (Cont.)

- Note symmetric cryptography based on transformations, asymmetric based on mathematical functions
 - Asymmetric much more compute intensive
 - Typically not used for bulk data encryption





Authentication

- Constraining set of potential senders of a message
 - Complementary and sometimes redundant to encryption.
 - Also can prove message unmodified.
- Algorithm components
 - A set K of keys
 - A set M of messages
 - A set A of authenticators
 - A function $S: K \rightarrow (M \rightarrow A)$
 - That is, for each $k \in K$, S(k) is a function for generating authenticators from messages.
 - ▶ Both S and S(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions
 - A function V: K → (M× A→ {true, false}). That is, for each k ∈ K, V(k) is a function for verifying authenticators on messages.
 - ▶ Both V and V(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions.





Authentication (Cont.)

- For a message m, a computer can generate an authenticator $a \in A$ such that V(k)(m, a) = true only if it possesses S(k).
- Thus, computer holding S(k) can generate authenticators on messages so that any other computer possessing V(k) can verify them.
- Computer not holding S(k) cannot generate authenticators on messages that can be verified using V(k).
- Since authenticators are generally exposed (for example, they are sent on the network with the messages themselves), it must not be feasible to derive S(k) from the authenticators.





Authentication – Hash Functions

- Basis of authentication
- Creates small, fixed-size block of data (message digest, hash value)
 from m
- Hash Function H must be collision resistant on m
 - Must be infeasible to find an $m' \neq m$ such that H(m) = H(m')
- If H(m) = H(m'), then m = m'
 - The message has not been modified
- Common message-digest functions include MD5, which produces a 128-bit hash, and SHA-1, which outputs a 160-bit hash





Authentication - MAC

- Symmetric encryption used in message-authentication code (MAC) authentication algorithm
- Simple example:
 - MAC defines S(k)(m) = f(k, H(m))
 - Where f is a function that is one-way on its first argument
 - k cannot be derived from f(k, H(m))
 - Because of the collision resistance in the hash function, reasonably assured no other message could create the same MAC
 - A suitable verification algorithm is $V(k)(m, a) \equiv (f(k,m) = a)$
 - Note that k is needed to compute both S(k) and V(k), so anyone able to compute one can compute the other





Authentication – Digital Signature

- Based on asymmetric keys and digital signature algorithm
- Authenticators produced are digital signatures
- In a digital-signature algorithm, computationally infeasible to derive $S(k_s)$ from $V(k_v)$
 - V is a one-way function
 - Thus, k_v is the public key and k_s is the private key
- Consider the RSA digital-signature algorithm
 - Similar to the RSA encryption algorithm, but the key use is reversed
 - Digital signature of message S(k_s)(m) = H(m)^{k_s} mod N
 - The key k_s again is a pair d, N, where N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q
 - Verification algorithm is $V(k_v)(m, a) \equiv (a^{k_v} \mod N = H(m))$
 - ▶ Where k_v satisfies $k_v k_s \mod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$





Authentication (Cont.)

- Why authentication if a subset of encryption?
 - Fewer computations (except for RSA digital signatures)
 - Authenticator usually shorter than message
 - Sometimes want authentication but not confidentiality
 - Signed patches et al
 - Can be basis for non-repudiation






Key Distribution

- Delivery of symmetric key is huge challenge
 - Sometimes done out-of-band
- Asymmetric keys can proliferate stored on key ring
 - Even asymmetric key distribution needs care man-in-the-middle attack





Man-in-the-middle Attack on Asymmetric Cryptography







Digital Certificates

- Proof of who or what owns a public key
- Public key digitally signed a trusted party
- Trusted party receives proof of identification from entity and certifies that public key belongs to entity
- Certificate authority are trusted party their public keys included with web browser distributions
 - They vouch for other authorities via digitally signing their keys, and so on





Encryption Example - SSL

- Insertion of cryptography at one layer of the ISO network model (the transport layer)
- SSL Secure Socket Layer (also called TLS)
- Cryptographic protocol that limits two computers to only exchange messages with each other
 - Very complicated, with many variations
- Used between web servers and browsers for secure communication (credit card numbers)
- The server is verified with a certificate assuring client is talking to correct server
- Asymmetric cryptography used to establish a secure session key (symmetric encryption) for bulk of communication during session
- Communication between each computer theb uses symmetric key cryptography





User Authentication

- Crucial to identify user correctly, as protection systems depend on user
 ID
- User identity most often established through passwords, can be considered a special case of either keys or capabilities
 - Also can include something user has and /or a user attribute
- Passwords must be kept secret
 - Frequent change of passwords
 - Use of "non-guessable" passwords
 - Log all invalid access attempts
- Passwords may also either be encrypted or allowed to be used only once





Implementing Security Defenses

- Defense in depth is most common security theory multiple layers of security
- Security policy describes what is being secured
- Vulnerability assessment compares real state of system / network compared to security policy
- Intrusion detection endeavors to detect attempted or successful intrusions
 - Signature-based detection spots known bad patterns
 - Anomaly detection spots differences from normal behavior
 - Can detect zero-day attacks
 - False-positives and false-negatives a problem
- Virus protection
- Auditing, accounting, and logging of all or specific system or network activities






Firewalling to Protect Systems and Networks

- A network firewall is placed between trusted and untrusted hosts
 - The firewall limits network access between these two security domains
- Can be tunneled or spoofed
 - Tunneling allows disallowed protocol to travel within allowed protocol (i.e., telnet inside of HTTP)
 - Firewall rules typically based on host name or IP address which can be spoofed
- Personal firewall is software layer on given host
 - Can monitor / limit traffic to and from the host
- Application proxy firewall understands application protocol and can control them (i.e., SMTP)
- System-call firewall monitors all important system calls and apply rules to them (i.e., this program can execute that system call)





Network Security Through Domain Separation Via Firewall







Computer Security Classifications

- U.S. Department of Defense outlines four divisions of computer security:
 A, B, C, and D
- **D** Minimal security
- C Provides discretionary protection through auditing
 - Divided into C1 and C2
 - C1 identifies cooperating users with the same level of protection
 - C2 allows user-level access control
- **B** All the properties of **C**, however each object may have unique sensitivity labels
 - Divided into B1, B2, and B3
- A Uses formal design and verification techniques to ensure security





Example: Windows XP

- Security is based on user accounts
 - Each user has unique security ID
 - Login to ID creates security access token
 - Includes security ID for user, for user's groups, and special privileges
 - Every process gets copy of token
 - System checks token to determine if access allowed or denied
- Uses a subject model to ensure access security. A subject tracks and manages permissions for each program that a user runs
- Each object in Windows XP has a security attribute defined by a security descriptor
 - For example, a file has a security descriptor that indicates the access permissions for all users

End of Chapter 15

